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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP75-00662R000100020027-3

Director of Central Intelligence

9 March 1949

Assistant Director, OCD

Coordination with Intelligence Division, GSUSA

1. CIA consistently receives from General Irwin and his immediate staff the finest kind of cooperation. This has been demonstrated again during the past couple of weeks in the arrangements which General Irwin's office has made for granting CIA access to certain materials of particular sensitivity.

2. Unfortunately, this top-level attitude of cooperation does not extend down to the subordinate levels of the Division with which CIA transacts its daily business, and the Dulles and Hoover comments on notably bad relations between CIA and ID remain true. We must iron these troubles out. We can achieve good cooperation at all levels if the senior officers both of CIA and of ID take forceful enough action to ensure that their subordinates are brought into line.

3. This Office, which is the chief point of contact between CIA and the Army for routine transactions, has instructed all hands that no request from ID or any other Army outfit is to be denied save with my specific approval, in advance, in each case. So far as I know, there are no unsatisfied requests from the Army - whether for documents or services - which we have turned down for any reason other than that they transcended our present capability. Nor have there been, - in many months.

4. Intelligence Group, which is our chief point of contact with the Army for routine transactions, is, on the contrary, obstructing us at every turn. The attached exhibits are offered in evidence.

5. It does not appear likely that the senior officers of the Intelligence Group have deliberately adopted a policy of obstructionism, which would be at variance with the policy of their Director. More likely, the barriers and obstructions are created by those of their subordinates who nurse the eternal Service jealousy of a civilian agency and who, by virtue of their duties, are in a position to say "No" to specific requests from their opposite numbers in CIA.

6. Recommendation. It is recommended that the DCI bring the attached Exhibits to the attention of General Irwin, and that he suggest as a possible remedy a firmly worded written instruction from General Irwin to all officers of the Intelligence Group. Experience has shown that oral instructions or statements of policy are fruitless in a case of this sort, for they leave subordinates free to interpret and amend them in the light of their own ingrained convictions. To chart a course of improved coordination with the Intelligence Group we need a fixed point of departure, and that can be supplied only by a firm instruction clearly written into the record.

JAMES M. ANDREWS

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CATALOG OF EXHIBITS

- A. Intelligence Division vs Intelligence Group:
ID cooperates, while IG obstructs.
- B. Intelligence Group Memorandum of 25 June 1948:
IG has established the machinery for obstructionism by assuming the ID function of serving as channel between CIA and all offices of the Army.
- C. Intelligence Reports listed by Chief Signal Officer:
A recent and still unremoved obstruction created by IG, citing the Third Agency Rule of 1941.
- D. Intelligence Reports listed by the Surgeon General:
A still more recent example, again citing the Third Agency Rule of 1941.
- E. The "Third Agency Rule" of 1941: an interdepartmental agreement written before Pearl Harbor and before the National Security Act.
- F. The National Security Act of 1947: providing that CIA is to have access to all intelligence bearing on the national security.
- G. Congressional intent concerning CIA: making it clear that Congress meant what it wrote into the National Security Act concerning CIA's right of access to all available intelligence bearing on the national security.
- H. SNNCC 252/9, concurred in by State, War and Navy after passage of the National Security Act, and recognizing that the "Third Agency" policy does not apply to CIA.
- I. Hoover Commission Report: again affirming that CIA under the act must draw on all available sources, and that its relationships with G-2 are unsatisfactory.
- J. Dulles Report: emphasizing CIA's need for all available information, pointing out that there is a tendency on the part of the Services to withhold information on various and spurious grounds, and asserting that CIA must if necessary take forceful action to break down this barrier.

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